IJE Advance Access originally published online on January 12, 2009
International Journal of Epidemiology 2009 38(3):675-677; doi:10.1093/ije/dyn361
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Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Epidemiological Association © The Author 2009; all rights reserved.
Viewpoint
The skeptical epidemiologist
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Imperial College, Norfolk Place W2 1PG, London.
*Corresponding author. Imperial College London. E-mail: p.vineis@imperial.ac.uk
Accepted 6 November 2008
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
| A simplified epistemology |
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Should epidemiologists try to infer that certain exposures are causes of certain diseases? Or should they just restrict themselves to a mere description of possible risk factors, according to a modest or humble epistemology?1 There is in fact an old tradition in science that rejects the idea of causality. Such tradition has its roots in early positivism and champions in Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell (who compared the concept of cause to monarchy, an old-fashioned but not entirely innocuous relic of the past). Positivist science preferred not to take a stand on causation, and to stick to mathematical functions instead.
Epistemology has evolved since then, and causality is again in the horizon of scientists.2 However, we should be aware that there are at least two clearly distinct levels in the use of the concept of cause. On one side there is a cognitive use, i.e. this use refers to what
| Is epidemiology junk science? |
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